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This paper is concerned with the realism of mechanisms that implement social
choice functions in the traditional sense. Will agents actually play the equilibrium
assumed by the analysis? As an example, we study convergence and stability prop-
erties of SjÄ ostrÄ om's (1994) mechanism, on the assumption that boundedly rational
players ¯nd their way to equilibrium using monotonic learning dynamics. This
mechanism implements most social choice functions in economic enviroments using
as a solution concept the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (only
one round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies is needed). There are, how-
ever, many sets of Nash equilibria whose payo®s may be very di®erent from those
desired by the social choice function. We show that many equilibria in all the sets
of equilibria we describe are the limit points of trajectories that have completely
mixed initial coniditions. The initial conditions that lead to these equilibria need
not be very close to the limiting point. Furthermore, even if the dynamics converge
to the \right" set of equilibria, it still can converge to quite a poor outcome in
welfare terms.
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11 Introduction
The theory of implementation studies the problem of designing decentralized institutions
through which certain socially desirable objectives can be achieved. These social arrange-
ments should be able to operate without extensive knowledge by the principal about the
agents, and in a variety of environments. The principal should ensure that the rules of
the game are respected by the agents, and such rules should be designed so that it is in
the best interest of the agents to take actions that lead to the socially desirable outcome,
given the environment.
More precisely, a social choice rule is implemented by a mechanism (game-form) if for
every possible environment (preference pro¯le) the solution (set of equilibrium outcomes)
of the mechanism coincides with the set of outcomes of the social choice rule for every
possible environment.
One of the problems that are faced by the implementation theorist is the choice of a
solution concept. This is no trivial matter because for di®erent solution concepts the
range of social choice rules that can be implemented varies dramatically. As Moore (1990)
points out \choice rules are unlikely to be implementable in dominant strategy equilibrium
if the domain is very rich and/or the choice rule is e±cient". In the case of single-valued
choice rules he also notes that \the move from dominant strategy to Nash may not help at
all: only the restricted class of strategy-proof choice may be Nash implementable". If the
solution concept is more re¯ned, then the domain of the social choice rule can be much
larger. In fact, the social choice rule domains are considerably enlarged for subgame-
perfect implementation (Moore and Repullo 1988), and even more so when the solution
concept is the iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies (Abreu and Matsushima
1994, Jackson et al.1994, SjÄ ostrÄ om 1994). In fact, as SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994) says: \With enough
ingenuity the planner can implement `anything"'.
The question that arises then is whether the equilibrium concept chosen is a good one for
the game in object. One way to answer the question is to assume that agents are bound-
edly rational and that they adjust their actions over time through some trial and error
learning procedure. One can then analyze under which conditions the actions that lead to
the socially desirable outcomes are played asymptotically, if at all. Research in implemen-
tation theory has paid little attention to the problem of how an equilibrium is reached.
Some exceptions are the papers of Muench and Walker (1984) and de Trenqualye (1988),
who study the local stability of the Groves and Ledyard (1977) mechanism, and Cabrales
(1996), who studies the global convergence of the canonical mechanism (Maskin 1977,
Repullo 1987) of Nash implementation and the mechanisms of Abreu and Matsushima
(1992, 1994).
In this paper we study the convergence and stability properties of the SjÄ ostrÄ om's (1994)
mechanism when one assumes that the players are boundedly rational and the dynamics
are monotonic (Samuelson and Zhang 1992, Weibull 1995). One particularly well known
2member of the family of monotonic dynamics is the replicator dynamics of evolutionary
game theory (Taylor and Jonker, 1978). These dynamics have been given a learning
theoretic foundation by BÄ orgers and Sarin (1993), and they can also be interpreted as a
model of imitation (Schlag, 1994). SjÄ ostrÄ om's (1994) mechanism and the one that Jackson
et al. (1994) study for separable environments are very similar and most of our results
would generalize easily for that mechanism as well.
We concentrate on SjÄ ostrÄ om's mechanism for several reasons. One is that the conditions
for implementation are quite weak. Although the environments that are permitted are not
universal, they are rich enough for most economic problems. Furthermore, this reduction
in the domain permits the author to implement the social choice rule with a \bounded"
game and thus makes it immune to the criticisms of Jackson (1992). Finally, although
the solution concept is the iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated strategies (it also
implements in undominated Nash equilibria), it only needs one round of deletion of weakly
dominated strategies (the ¯rst). This last feature of the mechanism makes it particularly
attractive since under some assumptions of imperfect knowledge of agents (either because
of payo® uncertainty as in Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990, or through lack of perfect common
knowledge of rationality as in BÄ orgers, 1994) the appropriate solution concept implies one
round of deletion of weakly dominated strategies and then the iterated deletion of strictly
dominated strategies.
In SjÄ ostrÄ om's (1994) mechanism the agents are arranged to announce their preferences
and those of their two closest neighbors. The mechanism is designed in such a way that
a truthful report of one's own preferences is weakly dominant (it does not a®ect one's
payo®, except in a set of states which is called totally inconsistent, and in those states
it is preferable to report them truthfully). Since in this mechanism it is advantageous to
report the same preferences about your neighbors that they are reporting about themselves
it is clear that the only equilibrium that survives the ¯rst round of deletion of weakly
dominated strategies is the truth-telling one. There are, however, many other Nash
equilibria. For every preference pro¯le R, there is a component (i.e. a closed and connected
set) of equilibria in which all agents report the preferences for their neighbors indicated
in R and they report the preferences about themselves indicated in R with high enough
(this need not be very high) probability. The reason for this is that the mechanism makes
it important that all agents match their neighbors' announcements about themselves, but
the report about oneself is only important in some unlikely (totally inconsistent) state.
We show that many equilibria in all the components of equilibria we have described are the
limit points of trajectories of the learning dynamics that have completely mixed initial
conditions (that is, initial conditions that give strictly positive weights to all possible
messages). Although the general results are local, we can show by example (the game in
Figure 1, SjÄ ostrÄ om, 1994) that the initial conditions that lead to these equilibria need not
be close to the limiting point. Furthermore, and perhaps more worrying, the equilibria
which belong to the same component as the completely truthful report are not outcome
equivalent to such equilibrium, as they yield payo®s that are signi¯cantly di®erent (lower)
3to the payo®s of the social choice functions outcome. Therefore, even if the dynamics
converge to the \right" component of equilibria, it still can converge to quite a poor
outcome in welfare terms.
One could naively expect that evolution would eliminate weakly dominated strategies.
The reason why this doesn't happen is that the weakly dominant strategy grows faster
than the dominated one only if the totally inconsistent states are met often enough by the
players. But the weight of the totally inconsistent states is also decreasing over time since
people are learning to avoid such states. It may be that they decrease fast enough so that
the push towards the weakly dominant strategy is not enough to make the dominated
strategy disappear.
The fact that evolution does not eliminate weakly dominated strategies has been known
since at least Nachbar (1990). Samuelson (1993) discusses the issue of elimination of
weakly dominated strategies in evolutionary games. Binmore et al. (1995) have shown
the implications of these ¯ndings for the ultimatum bargaining game. In particular, they
provide a numerical example, based on the classic \chain store game", in which a) there are
trajectories of the replicator dynamics which converge to the Nash equilibrium component
in which the players choose a weakly dominated strategy with positive probability and
b) in the presence of mutations, such component may even exhibit asymptotic stability
properties. These results are more than a theoretical curiosity. Binmore and Samuelson
(1996) note that: \the experimental evidence is now strong that one cannot rely on
predictions that depend on deleting weakly dominated strategies".
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. In section 2 we introduce some nota-
tion, we describe the mechanism and we make the assumptions about the dynamics. In
section 3 we fully characterize (for all interior initial conditions) the set of limit points
of the dynamics for the game in Figure 1, SjÄ ostrÄ om 1994, to be considered a simpli¯ed
version of the mechanism. In section 4 we give local results (for some interior initial con-
ditions) for the set of limit points of the dynamics for the general game. In section 5 we
describe the asymptotic stability properties of the sets of limit points in the presence of
mutations. Finally, section 6 concludes, together with an appendix containing the proofs
of the relevant propositions.
2 The model and the dynamics
We will ¯rst introduce some notation, the assumptions on preferences and the game
form proposed by SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994). Then we introduce the assumptions we make on the
dynamics.
The only important change we make in the presentation with respect to SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994)
is that we make the assumptions on a Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function instead
of on the preference relation. We do this because we need to specify the payo® functions
4for mixed strategies, since the dynamics are de¯ned on the mixed strategy simplex.
There is a set I ´ f1;:::;ng (with n ¸ 3) of agents and a set A 2 <m
+ of feasible
consumption plans. The preferences of agent i 2 I are represented with a (Von Neumann-
Morgenstern) utility function vi : A £ ©i ! <, where ©i speci¯es a ¯nite set of possible
utility functions. An element Ri of ©i is meant to represent the preferences of agent i
over A. A preference pro¯le is a vector R = (R1;:::;Rn), where Ri 2 ©i. The preference
pro¯les will be common knowledge among the agents. The following assumptions are
made concerning preferences and feasible consumption pro¯les.
Assumption p.1. The set of feasible consumption pro¯les is convex. For all a;a0 2 A
and for all ¸ 2[0;1] then ¸a + (1 ¡ ¸)a0 2 A:
Assumption p.2. The preferences represented by Ri 2 ©i are complete and transitive.
Assumption p.3. The preferences represented by Ri 2 ©i are strictly convex. That is,
for any a;a0 2 Rm
+ and for all ¸ 2 (0;1) if a 6 =a0 and vi(a;Ri) ¸ vi(a0;Ri) then
vi(¸a + (1 ¡ ¸)a0;Ri) > vi(a0;Ri):
Assumption p.4. For any Ri 2 ©i if a ¸ 0 and a 6 =0 then vi(a;Ri) ¸ vi(0;Ri):
Assumption p.5. Preference reversal. For any Ri;R0
i 2 ©i if Ri 6 =R0
i then there are
a;~ a 2 A such that vi(a;Ri) > vi(~ a;Ri) and vi(~ a;R0
i) > vi(a;R0
i):
For any set B µ <m
+ and any Ri 2 ©i a choice correspondence is de¯ned as follows:
c(B;Ri) ´ fa 2 Bj for all b 2 B;vi(a;Ri) ¸ vi(b;Ri)g:
A social choice function is a mapping f : © ! A; where f(R) ´ (f1(R);:::;fn(R)). A
mechanism is a pair ¡ ´ (M;®), where M ´ £i2IMi and ®: M ! A; where ®(m) ´
(®1(m);:::;®n(m)). Mi is the message space of agent i and ® is the outcome function. A
mechanism and a preference pro¯le de¯ne a game.
Let M¡i ´ M1£:::£Mi¡1£Mi+1£:::£Mn. Given a mechanism ¡ and a preference pro¯le
R, we say that mi is weakly dominated for some set of messages F ´ £i2IFi µ M if there
exists a message m0
i 2 Fi such that vi(®i(m0
i;m¡i);Ri) ¸ vi(®i(mi;m¡i);Ri) for all m¡i 2
F¡i and there is some m¤




De¯ne the set Ui(F : (¡;R)) ´ fmi 2 Fijmi is not weakly dominated in F for the game
(¡;R)g:
The message mi is a best response for player i, to m¡i 2 M¡i if vi(®i(mi;m¡i);Ri) ¸
vi(®i(m0
i;m¡i);Ri) for all m0
i 2 Mi. A message pro¯le m is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if mi
is a best response to m¡i for all i 2 N. A message pro¯le m 2 M is an undominated Nash
equilibrium (UNE) for the game (¡;R) if it is a Nash equilibrium and mi 2 Ui(M : (¡;R)):
Let UNE(¡;R) ´ f®(m) 2 Ajm is an UNE for the game (¡;R)g:
We say that a mechanism (M;®) implements a social choice function f in undominated
Nash equilibrium if for all R 2 ©, f(R) = UNE(R).
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i (¡;R) = Ui(M : (¡;R)), and
if Uk
i (¡;R) has been de¯ned for k ¸ 1, let U
k+1
i (¡;R) ´ Ui(£j2IUk
j (¡;R) : (¡;R)):Let
U1
i (¡;R) ´ \1
k=1Uk
i (¡;R): Let IWD(¡;R) ´ f®(m) 2 Ajmi 2 U1
i (¡;R) for all ig:
We say that a mechanism (M;g) implements a social choice function f with iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies if for all R 2 ©, f(R) = IWD(R):
We now construct a mechanism.
Let Mi = ©i¡1 £ ©i £ ©i+1, so that each individual announces the preferences of her two
neighbors, and let members of Mi and M be denoted mi and m respectively. A generic
strategy is therefore mi = (Ri
i¡1;Ri
i;Ri
i+1): A K-tuple of messages fmj1;:::;mjKg is
totally consistent if whenever agents i;k 2 fj1;:::;jKg both announce the preference of
player j 2 I, then Ri
j = Rk
j: On the other hand, a K-tuple of messages fmj1;:::;mjKg is
totally inconsistent if whenever agents i;k 2 fj1;:::;jKg both announce the preference




i 2 ©i, where Ri 6 =R0
i. By assumption p.6 there are a;~ a 2 A such
that vi(a;Ri) > vi(~ a;Ri) and vi(~ a;R0
i) > vi(a;R0
i): We can choose a and ~ a so that
vi(a;Ri) > vi(a0;Ri) for all a0 in the line segment between a and ~ a: Given this pair (a;~ a) let
¯i(Ri;R0
i) ´ fb 2 <+
























i ) if m¡i is totally inconsistent
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nfi(Á(i;m)) Otherwise












To understand the mechanism notice that the only time when the choice of an announce-
ment Ri
i has any e®ect on payo®s is when m¡i is totally inconsistent. In that case, the out-




i )) according to the announced Ri
i.
For this reason announcing the true preference R¤
i can never hurt. Furthermore, for every
alternative announcement Ri






i = ^ Ri and the set ¯i(:;:) is constructed in such a way that c(¯i(R¤
i; ^ Ri);R¤
i)
is strictly preferred to c(¯i(R¤
i; ^ Ri); ^ Ri). Therefore, a message mi = (Ri
i¡1; ^ Ri;Ri
i+1) is
weakly dominated by a message mi = (Ri
i¡1;R¤
i;Ri
i+1), that is, untruthful announcements
about oneself are weakly dominated.
Once these weakly dominated strategies are eliminated and all agents announce the true
preferences about themselves, R
j
j = R¤
j, it is strictly dominated to announce untruthful









disagreeing with the neighbors is punished with the 0 consumption bundle.
6These two facts establish the main theorem in SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994).
Proposition 0. Let f be an arbitrary social choice function. The mechanism described
above implements f in UNE and in IWD.
It is important to notice, for the discussion we will undertake below, that the set of
states for which not announcing the true preferences about oneself is weakly dominated
are themselves states that typically produce very bad outcomes for the opponents (at
least one of them will have 0 consumption, and probably many). If agents learn to avoid
totally inconsistent states very fast, there is no incentive to tell the truth about oneself.
The mechanism we have described puts a lot of emphasis in consensus announcements,
since disagreement is punished with 0 consumption, and truth-telling is only rewarded
in a set of states which need not be very prominent in the minds of the players. That
is precisely the reason why convergence to outcomes of the social choice function may
fail to occur. This con°ict is typical of other mechanisms that implement in the iterated
deletion of weakly dominated strategies, like Abreu and Matsushima (1994).
We now move on to the characterization of the evolutionary dynamics we analyze.
Fix a given preference pro¯le R 2 <: Let x
mi
i be the probability assigned by agent i
to message mi; and xi 2 ¢i be a mixed strategy for agent i (where ¢i denotes the
jMij ¡ 1-dimensional simplex which describes player i's mixed strategy space). Let also
x¡i 2 £j6=i¢j be a mixed strategy pro¯le for agents other than i; with x ´ (xi;x¡i) 2
¢ ´ £i2I¢i. Finally, let ui(xi;x¡i) = §m2Mvi(®i(mi;m¡i);Ri)¦j2Ix
mi
j :
We formalize player i's behavior in terms of the mixed strategy xi(t) she adopts at each
point in time. The vector x(t) will then describe the state of the system at time t, de¯ned
over the state space ¢, with ¢0 denoting the relative interior of ¢, that is, the set of
completely mixed strategy pro¯les. We make the following assumption:
Assumption d.1 The evolution of x(t) is given by a system of continuous-time di®er-
ential equations:
_ x = D(x(t)) (1)
We require that the autonomous system (1) satis¯es the standard regularity condition,
i.e., D must be i) Lipschitz continuous with ii)
P
k2Si Dk
i (:) = 0 and iii) limxmi!0
_ xmi
xmi
well-de¯ned and ¯nite.1 Furthermore, D must also satisfy the following requirements:







i (t). Then for all mi;m0
i; we have that
sign[gi(mi;x¡i(t)) ¡ gi(m
0
i;x¡i(t))] = sign[ui(mi;x¡i(t)) ¡ ui(m
0
i;x¡i(t))]
1A useful implication of this regularity assumption is that the solution of the dynamical system leaves
¢, as well as ¢0; invariant (and, a fortiori, forward invariant): any solution path starting from ¢ (¢0)
does not leave ¢ (¢0). This property will prove to be useful to obtain some of the results of the paper.
7Assumption d.2 is a common assumption in the evolutionary literature and we will not
dwell on it (see, for example, Samuelson and Zhang 1992 and Weibull, 1995).
Assumption d.3. Let Yi(mi;m0
i) = fx¡ij ui(mi;x¡i(t)) ¡ ui(m0
i;x¡i(t)) = 0_ g. Then, for










Assumption d.3 is less standard in the evolutionary literature and we will expand on
it when we discuss Proposition 4 because it will be helpful to understand why weakly
dominated strategies need not disappear in the limit. What assumption d.3 says is that
if the di®erence in payo®s between two strategies is going to zero a rate exp[¡n], the
di®erence in growth rates has to go to zero at least at a rate 1=n±. Continuity and
assumption d.2 demand that strategies that have the same payo® grow at the same rate,
but they impose no requirements on the speed at which the di®erence in growth rates
goes to zero as the di®erence in payo® go to zero. Assumption d.3 can be satis¯ed even
if the sensitivity of growth rates to payo®s is much higher than linear around zero (as
would be implied, for example, by the replicator dynamics and other aggregate monotonic
dynamics).
Assumption d.4. x(0) 2 ¢0
Finally, Assumption d.4, which is also standard in the evolutionary literature, is necessary
because it excludes the possibility that the selection dynamic acts only on a subset of
the strategy space. This possibility arises because the system is forward invariant, and
therefore a strategy that has zero weight at time zero would also have zero weight at
all subsequent times. We want to avoid this possibility because the selection dynamics
would be operating on a game which might be qualitatively di®erent from the game we
are trying to analyze.
3 An example.
We pre¯x the analysis of the dynamics of the mechanism with the following example,
taken from SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994), p. 504, which is intended to convey the essence of our
results. There is a unit of good which has to be divided among three players: 1, 2 and
3. The (Von-Neumann Morgenstern) utility functions of players 1 and 2 are linear in
the amount of good consumed, and this is common knowledge among the players and
the planner. The utility function of player 3 may have one of two possible types, either
linear on the amount of good consumed (we index these preferences by the number 1) or
linear until the amount of good consumed is 1/3, for consumptions larger than 1/3 the
utility remains constant at the value 1/3, since the agent becomes satiated (the index for
8these preferences is 0). The true preferences of player 3 are common knowledge among
the players, but the planner does not know them.
The social choice function recommends the consumption vector (1=3;1=3;1=3) for pref-
erences of type 1 and (1=4;1=4;1=2) for preferences of type 0. Notice that this social
choice function is such that agent 3 would like to conceal her preferences, and therefore
the planner needs a nontrivial mechanism to elicit the true preferences.
The mechanism proposed by SjÄ ostrÄ om requires the three players to make a simultaneous
statement about the preferences of player 3. Let m1
i;i 2 I represent the message in
which preferences of type 1 are announced, with m0
i denoting the announcement of type
0 preferences. Figure 1 illustrates the outcome function. We will assume for the analysis
that the true preferences are of type 1 and therefore Figure 1 is also the payo® function
of a game, which we call ¡ :
Figure 1
SjÄ ostrÄ om's Example: game ¡:
Player 1 picks a row, player 2 a column, and player 3 picks a matrix. We ¯rst notice that
the mechanism leads to a game which is weakly dominance solvable, in the sense that it
can be reduced to a single cell, corresponding to the truth-telling equilibrium outcome,
by the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. Unlike other weakly solvable
games, this procedure yields, in this example, a unique outcome, independently of the
order of removal of strategies. Player 3 ¯rst deletes her (weakly) dominated strategy m0
3
(the other agents have no dominated strategies at this stage). Once m0
3 is removed, the
strategies m0
1 and m0
2 for players 1 and 2 become strictly dominated. The unique strategy
pro¯le selected in this way is (m1
1;m1
2;m1




3) is also an equilibrium, and that this equilibrium yields a higher payo® for




Given that each player has only two strategies in her support, with an abuse of notation
we set xi ´ x
m1
i
i :2 We ¯rst characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the game:
Proposition 1. The set NE of Nash equilibria of ¡ is the union of precisely two disjoint
components NE0 and NE1, where:
NE0 ´ fx 2 ¢jx1 = x2 = 0;x3 · 3
7g
NE1 ´ fx 2 ¢jx1 = x2 = 1;x3 · 1
2g
Proof. See the Appendix.2
2The fact that each player has only two available options will also allow us to express the dynamics in
terms of the payo® di®erence between player i's truthful and untruthful strategy, which we call ¢¦i(x(t))











9Denote with RE(¡) the set of restpoints of ¡ under any monotonic dynamic. It is
straightforward to show that RE(¡) contains (together with all the pure strategy pro-
¯les) only the following components: RE0 ´ fx 2 ¢jx1 = x2 = 0;x3 2 [0;1]g and
RE1 ´ fx 2 ¢jx1 = x2 = 1;x3 2 [0;1]g: Our task is to study the asymptotics of a
monotonic selection dynamic whose initial state lies in the relative interior of the state
space:
Proposition 2. Any solution x(t;x(0)) of a monotonic selection dynamics _ x = D(x)
with completely mixed initial conditions converges asymptotically to NE.
Proof. See the Appendix2
If initial conditions are completely mixed, we then know that the evolutionary dynamics
will eventually converge to a Nash equilibrium of the game. In the following section we
extend the result to the more general setting of SjÄ ostrÄ om's mechanism.
4 Local results for the general game
In this section we show that the results of the previous section generalize locally. Propo-
sition 3 characterizes some components of Nash equilibria for the game induced by the
mechanism in SjÄ ostrÄ om (1994), which we described in section 2. Any message pro¯le in
which the agents are unanimous in the (arbitrary) preference pro¯le they announce, R¤,
(or, more appropriately, the preferences they announce about their neighbors and them-
selves are taken from the pro¯le R¤) is an equilibrium. Furthermore, a mixed strategy
pro¯le in which every agent mixes between messages consistent with R¤ and other prefer-
ence pro¯les that only di®er in the announcement they make about their own preferences
is also an equilibrium, as long as R¤ is given a high enough weight. As we showed in the
example, the weight given to R¤ need not be very high. The equilibria in a component are
not payo® equivalent, since disagreeing with a neighbor (an event with nonzero probabil-
ity in the mixed strategy equilibria) results in a punishment. Proposition 4 shows that
any of the previous equilibria that gives enough weight to R¤ is the limit point of some
interior path for a monotonic selection dynamic. Figure 2 shows that the initial condition
need not be very close to the limit point.












is a consensus announcement by agent i, Ui is utility associated to the most preferred
outcome from the social choice function for agent i with true preferences ^ Ri and Uin is
utility associated to the most preferred consumption bundle among those that result from
dividing the bundles assigned by the social choice function by n.









and ¹ Si = fmi 2 Mijmi 6 2Sig The set Si is the set of all mixed strategies in which













Ujn ¡ uj(0; ^ Rj)
vj(fi(Á(j;R¤)); ^ Rj) ¡ vj(0; ^ Rj) + Ujn ¡ vj(0; ^ Rj)
for all i and all j 6 =i. The set S
ki
i is the set of all mixed strategies in which announcements
about the neighbors agrees with R¤, and the probability of announcing R¤
i is higher than
ki.
Proposition 3. For all ^ R;R¤ 2 < and xi 2 S
ki
i , x is a Nash equilibrium of (®; ^ R).
Proof. See the Appendix.2
Now we prove that not only are there other Nash equilibria, but that elements in those
components can be reached by paths starting in the interior to the simplex. By assumption
d.2 we know that for all hv > 0 with ui(mi;x¡i(t))¡ui(m0
i;x¡i(t)) < ¡hv, there is hg > 0,
such that gi(mi;x¡i(t)) ¡ gi(m0
i;x¡i(t)) < ¡hg:
Let hv be a constant such that 0 · hv · min








Ui ¡ vi(0; ^ Ri) + hv







Note that by de¯nition H 2 [0;1]:
By Assumption d.3 we know that there exists µi(mi;m0





















i , and L = exp
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Proposition 4. Assume that for all i , x
m¤
i
i (0) is big enough so that, x
m¤
i









< µ. Under these conditions we have that






























i (0)L for all t and all mi 2 Si
Proof. See the Appendix.2
Part a) of the Proposition says that the weight of any strategy in ¹ Si decreases over time
at a rate higher than hg. This is important because the strategies for which not telling
the truth about oneself is dominated are all in ¹ Sj, so if the weight of these strategies
decrease over time, the payo® advantage of the dominating strategy disappears over time,
and makes it possible for a dominated strategy to have positive limiting weight.
Part b) ensures that the weight of m¤
i is always high enough. If the weight of m¤
i is high
enough, then the strategies in the sets ¹ Sj have a lower payo® than strategies in Sj since an
announcement about your neighbor that does not coincide with her announcement about
herself is punished.
In fact parts a) and b) reinforce each other. While m¤
i keeps having a high enough weight,
the weight of strategies in ¹ Sj decreases, and if strategies in ¹ Sj decrease fast enough the
weight of m¤
i does not go below a certain bound. All of this provided that m¤
i started
with high enough weight, which as Figure 2 demonstrates, need not be very high.
Notice that part b) guarantees that pure strategy equilibria in the \wrong" component are
attractors of interior paths. Part c) says that the weight of m¤
i in the limit is less than 1,
and therefore some mixed strategy equilibria are attractors as well if the initial conditions
give su±ciently little weight to strategies in ¹ Sj. This guarantees that even if there is
convergence to the \right" component it need not be to the pure strategy equilibrium, and
remember that the equilibria are not payo® equivalent (the mixed strategy equilibria have
lower expected payo® because agents are punished for announcing discordant preferences).
The convergence to the mixed equilibria can happen because the payo®s to all strategies
in Si are similar if the weight of strategies in ¹ Sj is small, and by a) the weight of strategies
in ¹ Sj is decreasing. So even though m¤
i has a payo® advantage, the advantage goes to
zero over time, and assumption d.3 guarantee that it does not accumulate fast enough.
If d.3 didn't hold, equilibria which do not implement the social choice function may fail
to be a limit point for the dynamics. Convergence to the \wrong" equilibrium obtains
only if a weakly dominated strategy for player i (call it m, and call m0 the strategy that
weakly dominates m) gets positive weight in the limit. But along the way to the limit
the strategy against which m and m0 di®er (call it y) has also positive weight (since the
system is regular, and therefore forward invariant). So by assumption d.2 the growth
rate of m0 is larger than the growth rate of m. The weight of m0=m is the integral of the
di®erence in growth rates of m0 and m. If the limiting value of this integral is in¯nite the
limiting value of xm
i (t) would be zero. But the weight of y (and thus the di®erence in
12payo®s) may be going to zero, thus the weight of m0=m is an integral of a function that
goes to zero, which may be ¯nite.
Assumption d.3 describes how the growth rates have to relate to payo®s (when di®er-
ences in payo®s are small) so that the limiting value of a dominated strategy is not zero.
Assumption d.3 would hold, for example, if the growth rates were linear in the payo®s,
as it happens with the replicator dynamics. But the requirement is much weaker than
that, because it is only a local requirement around zero, and because the rate at which
growth rates go to zero with payo®s can be much higher than linear. In other words, even
if the growth rates were much more sensitive to payo® di®erences (around zero) than the
replicator dynamics allow, assumption d.3 could still be satis¯ed.
The elimination of a weakly dominated strategy in an evolutionary context requires that
the strategy against which the dominated strategy gives a lower payo® than the domi-
nating strategy has to appear su±ciently often or that its appearance has to provoke a
dramatic enough reduction in the dominated strategy.
5 More on the example (stability with/out drift).
In the previous section, we have extended the convergence result contained in Proposition
2, and we have shown that the limit points of the dynamics for interior initial conditions
are generally di®erent from the outcomes intended by the planner. We now go back to
the example in order to test the stability properties of NE. To do so, some further
terminology is needed:
Definition 1. Let C be a closed set of restpoints in ¢ of the dynamics (1): Then: (i) C
is called (interior) stable if, for every neighborhood O of C, there is another neighborhood
U of C, with U ½ O;such that the trajectory of any initial point in U\¢ (U \ ¢0) remain
inside O;
(ii) C is called (interior) attracting if is contained in an open set O such that every initial
point in O and also in (the interior of) ¢ evolves under D to C. C is globally (interior)
attracting if every point in (the interior of) ¢ evolves under D to C;
(iii) C is called (interior) asymptotically stable if it is (interior) attracting and (interior)
stable.
To simplify the analysis, we set additional conditions on the dynamics, which is the
purpose of the following assumption, (which replaces assumptions d.1-5):
Assumption d.5. The evolution of x(t) is given by the following system of continuous-
time di®erential equations:
_ xi ´ ~ Di(x(t);¸) = xi(t)(1 ¡ xi(t))¢¦i(:) + ¸(¯i ¡ xi(t)) (2)
13with ¸ ¸ 0; ¯1 = ¯2 = 1
2 and ¯3 = ¯ 2 (0;1):
In words: the evolutionary dynamic is now composed of two additive terms. The ¯rst
represents the standard replicator dynamic, while the second term ensures that, at each
point in time, each strategy is played with positive probability, no matter how it performs
against the current opponents' mixed strategy pro¯le (i.e. it points the dynamic toward
the relative interior of the state space ¢). Following Binmore and Samuelson (1996),
this latter term is called drift: it opens the model to the possibility of a heterogeneity
of behaviors. Binmore et al. (1995), derive an analogous system in the following way.
At each point in time, a ¯xed proportion of players (of measure ¸
1+¸) is replaced by new
individuals whose aggregate behavior is represented by a generic, constant, completely
mixed strategy (i.e. ¯i), while the rest of the population aggregate behavior follows the
replicator dynamics. The relative importance of the drift is measured by ¸;which we refer
to as the drift level. We assume ¸ to be "very small", re°ecting the fact that all the
major forces which govern the dynamics should be captured by the evolutionary dynamic
de¯ned by D; which here takes the form of the replicator dynamics.
We check how the model reacts to the introduction of such a perturbation. The stability
analysis of the replicator dynamics with drift will give us information about the e®ects of
small changes in the vector ¯eld on the equilibria of the system de¯ned by the replicator
dynamic (in other words, it will test the structural stability of such equilibria). To simplify
the exposition, ¯1 and ¯2 have been chosen to be 1/2 since only the value of ¯3 turns out
to be genuinely signi¯cant.
We start our analysis on the stability properties of NE looking at the case of the replicator
dynamic without drift (i.e. when ¸ = 0): We know from Proposition 2, that NE is globally
interior attracting, since it attracts every interior path under any monotonic selection
dynamic (of which the replicator dynamic is a special case). We now take a closer look
at the stability properties of each component of Nash equilibria separately (i.e. NE0 and
NE1) :
Figure 2
The replicator dynamic and game ¡
Figure 2 shows a phase diagram describing trajectories of the replicator dynamic starting
from some interior initial conditions. The Nash equilibrium component NE0 (NE1) is
represented by a bold segment in the bottom-left (top-right) corner of the state space
¢: First notice that, as we know from Proposition 2, all trajectories converge to a Nash
equilibrium of the game. Moreover, the diagram shows (consistently with Proposition 4)
that there are some trajectories of the replicator dynamic which converge to NE0; the
Nash equilibrium component in which both players 1 and 2 deliver the false message with
probability 1. However, this latter component is not asymptotically stable, as can be
easily spotted from the diagram. Trajectories starting arbitrarily close to NE0; provided
14x3 > 3
7; will eventually converge to the truth-telling component. We summarize the key
properties of these trajectories in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Under the replicator dynamic (i) NE1 is interior asymptotically stable,
whereas (ii) NE0 is not.
Proof. See the Appendix. 2
We now move to the analysis of the replicator dynamic with drift:
Figure 3
The dynamic with drift and game ¡
Let ¯ 2 (0;1) be a generic element of the space of the feasible perturbations. Figure 3
shows the trajectories of the replicator dynamic with drift under two di®erent speci¯ca-
tions of ¯: Diagram 3b) represents a situation in which, in the proximity of NE0; the drift
against m0
i is uniform across players, where in diagram 3a) the drift against m0
3 is lower.
As the ¯gures show, there is a local attractor close to NE1 in both cases. Moreover, none
of the elements of NE0 is a restpoint of the dynamic with drift in ¯gure 3b), while ¯gure
3a) shows that there is an additional local attractor which belongs to NE0 : trajectories
starting close to NE0 converge to it, as it happens in the case of the replicator dynamics
without drift.
We are interested in the convergence and stability properties of (2) when ¸ ! 0; consid-
ering two di®erent con¯gurations of the drift parameter ¯ :


















49 ¼ :0222673, CASE A depicts a situation in which, for small values of xi;
the drift against the untruth-telling strategy is substantially lower for player 3 than for
her opponents.
4In the following proposition we characterize the set of restpoints of the dynamic with
drift, together with their stability properties:
Proposition 6. Let ^ RE(¯) be the set of restpoints of (2) for ¸ su±ciently close to 0.
The following properties hold:
a)8¯ 2 (0;1); ^ RE(¯) contains an element of NE1; which is also asymptotically stable.
b) under CASE A ^ RE(¯) contains also two additional restpoints, both belonging to NE0;
one of which is asymptotically stable.
Proof. See the Appendix:2.
15There is a striking similarity between the content of Proposition 6 and the ¯ndings of
Binmore et al. (1995), as we pointed out in the introduction. They analyze the chain
store game, in one of whose equilibrium components a player selects a weakly dominated
strategy with positive probability. This component is interior attracting. Moreover,
like our NE0; such component fails to be interior asymptotically stable, but for certain
parameter values it may be asymptotically stable when the system is slightly perturbed.
Given the failure of asymptotic stability without perturbations, one would expect any
perturbation to move the system away from the unstable component and the weakly
dominated strategy to become extinct. Proposition 6 tells us that evolutionary game
theory does not provide a ground for such claim. The intuition is similar to the one
in Binmore et al. (1995). When there is drift, the strategies against which the weakly
dominated strategy does poorly will have positive weight at all times and therefore the
part of the dynamics that depend on payo®s pushes against the dominated strategy.
But the drift may provide a direct push in favor of the dominated strategy (and more
crucially, in favor of those strategies of the other players which do well against such
dominated strategy). When the balance between these two forces is right, one gets a
stable equilibrium with positive weight for the dominated strategy, as it happens in our
example.
6 Conclusions
We have argued that there is room for doubt about the practicability of one the of the
leading examples of implementation with iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies
when agents are boundedly rational. This result complements that obtained by Cabrales
(1996) for the Abreu and Matsushima (1994) mechanism. Since Cabrales (1996) uses
dynamics that are di®erent from those used here, it would be interesting to check if the
results we obtain here extend to Abreu and Matsushima (1994) games. More generally,
a deeper study with evolutionary tools of other mechanisms studied in the literature
would enhance our understanding of the performance of these mechanisms with boundedly
rational agents, a necessary step before mechanisms are used in real life.
Ideally one would like to design a game for which convergence to the preferred social
outcome could be guaranteed for the learning protocols that agents use. To achieve this
goal, it is necessary to conduct empirical and experimental studies that reveal how people
adjust their play in games like that studied in detail in this paper. The history of actual
social arrangements may also give clues as to how people learn in such environments. Dif-
ferent mechanisms for public good provision have existed for centuries in many countries.
These considerations imply the need for a substantial program of future research.
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187 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We already noticed that agent 3 has a weakly dominated
strategy (namely, m0
3). In particular, m1
3 (truth-telling) makes agent 3 (strictly) better o®
than m0
3 (lying), unless agents 1 and 2 coordinate their actions completely, that is, unless
they play m0
i i = 1;2 with probability 1 or they play m1
i i = 1;2 with probability 1, (in
which case, 3 is completely indi®erent). This leads to the following lemma:
Lemma 1. No strategy pro¯le in which x3 2 (0;1) can be a Nash equilibrium unless
x1 = x2 = 1 or x1 = x2 = 0, that is, unless agents 1 and 2 play the same strategy with
probability 1.
With this consideration in mind, we construct the proof as follows: we ¯x the mixed
strategy of player 3 and check what mixed strategies for player 1 and 2 can sustain a
















(x1(x3 ¡ 1) + 7x3 ¡ 3) (4)
we can make the following observations:
a) When x3 <
3
7, m0
i (lying) yields a strictly higher payo® than m1
i for both 1 and 2,
independently of what the other player does. Therefore, the strategy pro¯les in NE0
(and only those) will be Nash equilibria.
b) When x3 =
3
7, m0
1 yields a strictly higher payo® than m1
1 unless x2 = 0, and x2 = 0
makes player 1 indi®erent between m0
1 and m1
1 (a symmetric argument holds for player 2).












2 NE0 as the unique Nash equilibrium when x3 =
3
7:







there are no Nash equilibria. This happens because in this case if
x1 = 1, the best response of player 2 is x2 = 0 and if x1 = 0, the best response for player 2









2: In analogy with the case where x3 =
3




2 NE1 is the unique Nash equilibrium when x3 = 1
2:
e) When x3 >
1
2 announcing m1
i (truth-telling) is optimal for i = 1 and 2, independently
of what the other player does. Thus, the strategy pro¯les in NE1 (and only those) will
be Nash equilibria.
Since this exhausts all cases the result follows. 2
19Proof of Proposition 2. To prove the proposition, it is enough to show that any
interior trajectory converges. This is because, once convergence has been proved, we
can apply the standard result "convergence implies Nash under any monotonic selection
dynamics" (see, e.g. Weibull, 1995, Theorem 5.2 (iii)) to obtain the result.
We start by observing that the fact that the dynamic is forward invariant implies that
xi(t) is always de¯ned and positive, for any nonnegative t. By monotonicity, x3(t) is also a
positive, increasing function of t and bounded above by 1 (since m1
3 is a weakly dominant
strategy), therefore it must converge. This already implies convergence of player 3's mixed
strategy. Let us denote x¤
i´ limt!1 xi(t), when such a limit exists. Three alternative
cases have to be discussed:
a) x¤
3 = 0: If x¤
3 = 0 there must be a time t0 such that x3(t) < 3
7 for t > t0. This implies
that there is a k > 0 such that for all t0 > t, ¢¦i(x(t)) < ¡k for i = 1;2. This implies,
by monotonicity, limt!1 xi(t) = 0 for i = 1;2, thus x¤ = (0;0;0).
b) x¤
3 = 1: By a similar argument, monotonicity implies x¤ = (1;1;1):
c) x¤
3 2;(0;1): We want to prove that x¤
3 cannot converge to a value within this range
unless the system converges to a Nash equilibrium. To do so (given the special features
of our example) it is enough to show that, if x¤
3 2 (0;1) it then must be that both
players 1 and 2 select, in the limit, the same pure strategy. Given that this result implies
convergence of the entire mixed strategy pro¯le, the result follows. More formally, what
we have to prove is contained in the following lemma:
Lemma 3. If x¤
3 2 (0;1) then:
either
x¤
i = 0;i = 1;2 (CASE 0 hereafter)
or
x¤
i = 1;i = 1;2: (CASE 1)
Proof. Let's assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that neither of the above state-
ments is true. In that case, there must exist a sequence ftkg
1
k=1 and a positive constant
²> 0 such that either xi(tk) > ²;i = 1;2 or xi(tk) < 1¡²;i = 1;2 for all k (in other words,
the system must stay in¯nitely often an ² away from the faces of ¢ in which player 1 and
2 play the same pure strategy). We already noticed that these are the only faces of ¢ in
which both pure strategies for player 3 yield the same payo®: if the system stays away
from them in¯nitely often along the solution path, it then must be that the cumulative
payo® di®erence will grow unbounded as time goes to in¯nity. As we will see, this in turn
implies (by monotonicity) that x3(t) will also reach, in the limit, its highest value, that
is, x¤
3 = 1; as a result of the extinction of the weakly dominated strategy m0
3, which is a
contradiction.
To show this, we ¯rst notice that the payo® di®erence ¢¦i(x(t)) is a continuous function




2 + x1(t)(1 ¡ x1(t)) + x2(t)(1 ¡ x2(t))
6
(5)
Take gM ´ maxi2I;x¡i2¢¡i[jgi(mi;x¡i(t))j], i.e. the highest possible growth rate (in ab-
solute value) over all strategies and players (we know a max exists, since also gi(:) is
continuous in ¢): Then de¯ne ¿1;¿2;¿3 and ¿4 as follows:
¿1 solves ²exp[¡gM¿1] = ²
2 (i.e. ¿1 =
ln[2]
gM )
¿2 solves (1 ¡ ²)exp[¡gM¿2] = ²




¿3 solves ²exp[gM¿3] = 1 ¡ ²





¿4 solves (1 ¡ ²)exp[gM¿4] = 1 ¡ ²





and take @¿ ´ min[¿1;¿2;¿3;¿4]; that is, set a lower bound for the time interval in
which, after each tk, ²
2 < xi < 1 ¡ ²
2;i = 1;2 and therefore ¢¦3(x(t)) still remains
bounded away from 0 (i.e ¢¦3(x(t)) >
²(1¡²
2)
3 > 0;8t 2 [tk;tk + @¿]): Denote by G² =
n
























i.e. the time derivative of the log of the ratio between the probabilities with which each of
player i's pure strategies are played, which can be expressed in terms of the di®erence in
the growth rates. Notice that also °3(x(t)) will be a positive number bounded away from
0 in¯nitely often since, by assumption d.1, the di®erence in growth rates is a continuous
function of x(t) de¯ned on a compact set, which preserves the same sign of ¢¦3(x(t)):
This implies that we can always de¯ne a constant g² = minx2G² °3(x(t)), with g² > 0 by
assumption d.2. Also by assumption d.2 °3(x(t)) > g² () ¢¦3(x(t)) >
²(1¡ ²
2)
3 : If we
















which implies that x¤
3 = 1; which leads to a contradiction.2
To summarize, Lemma 3 shows that, if x¤
3 2 (0;1); x1(t) and x2(t) must converge (and
therefore x(t) must converge to a Nash equilibrium). Since this exhausts all cases the
result follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 3.
21For all ^ xi, such that ^ x
mi
i > 0 only if mi 2 Si we have,




¤)); ^ Ri) + (1 ¡ ¦j6=ix
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j )vi(0; ^ Ri):
For all ¹ xi,




























j )(vi(0; ^ Ri) ¡ Uin)
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j ¸ ¦j6=ikj ¸
Uin ¡ vi(0; ^ Ri)
vi(fi(Á(i;R¤)); ^ Ri) ¡ vi(0; ^ Ri) + Uin ¡ vi(0; ^ Ri)
: 2
Proof of Proposition 4. By contradiction.
Suppose that a) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does it for agent i
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Ui ¡ vi(0; ^ Ri) ¡ H
n¡1(vi(fi(Á(i;R
¤)); ^ Ri) + Ui ¡ 2vi(0; ^ Ri))
i
So we have that
ui(x
mi
i (t);x¡i(t)) ¡ ui(x
m¤
i
i (t);x¡i(t)) < ¡hv




22which integrating from 0 to t0 and given that x
m¤
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This is a contradiction.
Suppose that b) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does it for agent i
and that the boundary time is t0. Then it must be true that x
m¤
i
i (t0) = H.
First notice that for all mi 2 Sinfm¤
ig since the payo®s of strategy m¤
i and other strategies
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< µ, this implies by assumption d.3 that
(gi(m
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But this implies that x
m¤
i
i (t0) > H (using the assumption that x
m¤
i
i (0) L > H ), which is
a contradiction.
Suppose that c) is the statement that stops being true earliest, that it does it for agent i















23As before, notice that for all mi 2 Sinfm¤
ig the payo®s of strategy m¤
i and mi di®er only
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< µ, this implies by assumption d.3 that
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which is a contradiction. Since this exhausts all cases the result follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) We know, from Proposition 2, that _ x3 > 0 in any interior point. This implies that
if there is a time t such that x3(t) >
1
2, then x3(t0) >
1
2 for all t0 ¸ t. From equations
(3-4) we have that, whenever x3(t) > 1
2 , ¢¦i(x) > 0 for players 1 and 2. This implies
that if there is a time t such that x3(t) > 1
2, then _ xi > 0 for all t0 ¸ t for i = 1;2 and
therefore x(t) converges. Since convergence must be to a Nash equilibrium and x1 and
x2 have been increasing, x converges to NE1. To show the stability of NE1 it su±ces to
show that there is a neighborhood of NE1 such that, for all x(0) in this neighborhood,
there is a time t such that x3(t) > 1
2. Let xi(0) = 1 ¡ ²i for i = 1;2 and x3(0) = 1
2 ¡ ±,
with ²i > 0, ± > 0. From (3-4) we also have that ¡1 < ¢¦(x) < 1 for i = 1;2, thus
exp[¡t](1 ¡ ²i) < xi(t) < exp[t](1 ¡ ²i): (6)
Since ¢¦3(x) ·
x1(1¡x1)










(1 ¡ ²1)(exp[¡t] ¡ (1 ¡ ²1)
6
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and therefore x3(t) >
1
2 for ± small enough, which is what we wanted to show.
(ii). Assume that x3(0) > 3
7. Since _ x3(t) ¸ 0 for all t, x3(t) is an increasing function of
t, therefore it must converge. Since the initial condition x3(0) is larger than
3
7 it must
converge to a number larger than
3
7. We know that x(t) converges to a Nash equilibrium
by Proposition 2. Since there is no equilibrium in NE0 with x3 >
3
7, x(t) cannot converge
to a point in NE0. Since x3(0) can be arbitrarily close to 3
7 and therefore to the set NE0,
this set must be unstable. 2
Proof of Proposition 6. The proof is constructed as follows. We ¯rst characterize
the limit of the set of rest points ^ RE(¯), and then analyze the stability properties of each
of its elements.
We start by observing that, given ¯ 2 (0;1); any rest point must be completely mixed,
and it also must be x3 > ¯; as ¢¦3(:) is always positive in the interior of the state space
¢ (because m0
3 is a weakly dominated strategy).We also know, by the continuity of the
vector¯eld with respect to ¸; that every limiting rest point of the dynamic, as ¸ goes to
zero, must lie in the set of restpoints of the unperturbed dynamic RE (¡).
We analyze ¯rst the limit set of rest points under CASE 0. In this case, both players 1
and 2 play their strategy m0
i with probability 1, that is x0
i = 0; for i = 1;2. Setting _ x1 = 0









(1 ¡ x1)(3 + x1 ¡ x3(7 ¡ x2))
(7)
and an analogous expression can be obtained for
x2
¸ : Denote by x0
3 a limiting value in a





















¸ with the expression in (8), solve for x3; and substitute xi;i = 1;2
and ¸ by their limiting value of zero. The solutions for x0




1 + 7¯ +
q





1 + 7¯ ¡
q
1 ¡ ¯(46 ¡ 49¯)
10
25Remember that x0
3 must be a real, positive number, with ¯ < x0
3 < 3
7. For the ex-









; which determines the feasible range for both roots. Within
this interval of values for ¯, ^ x0
3 (· x0
3) is a strictly decreasing (increasing) function of ¯;
which has a minimum and a maximum, whose values are 15¡2
p
30








respectively. As ¯ ! 23¡4
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30




We now deal with the subset of limiting rest points under CASE 1, i.e. with limiting











3 + (1 ¡ x3)(
1



















3 a limiting value in a rest point for x3 in this latter case: By analogy with
CASE 0, we know from (10) that, if a rest point exists, it must be x1
3 >
1
2: There is a
unique feasible solution for x1




3 + 4¯ +
q
9 ¡ 16¯(1 ¡ ¯)
10
Following the same procedure for the remaining rest points of the unperturbed dynamics
(i.e. the pure strategy pro¯les which belong to RE (¡) and do not satisfy either CASE 0
or CASE 1) does not add any element to the limiting set of rest points of the perturbed
dynamics. This should not be surprising, as any other rest point of the unperturbed
replicator dynamics is unstable with respect to the interior. Since this exhausts all cases,
the result follows.
We now move to establish the stability properties of each limiting restpoint separately:
The Jacobian matrix for the dynamic system is as follows:
J(x;¸) =












6 (1 ¡ 2x3)¢¦3 ¡ ¸
We analyze CASE 0 ¯rst. We know that, in this case, we have two restpoints, which we call
^ x0 ´ (0;0; ^ x0
3) and · x0 ´ (0;0; · x0
3): We evaluate the Jacobian when x1;x2 and ¸ are equal











There are then two (identical) negative eigenvalues (since any limiting x0
3 < 3
7 for CASE
0), while the third eigenvalue is equal to zero. To determine the stability properties
of the perturbed system, the sign of the eigenvalue whose limit is zero becomes crucial
given that the continuity of J(:) ensures that the other two will be negative, for any ¸
26su±ciently small. We now linearize the rest points (as a function of ¸) around NE0. We
set ~ x(¸;±) ´ (±1¸;±2¸;x0
3 + ±3¸); where ± ´ (±1;±2;±3) denotes the vector collecting the









¯ ¯ ¯~ x(¸;±)
´
@¸
We do so because det(J(x;¸)); which is equal to zero 8x 2 NE0; will preserve the sign of
the third eigenvalue, given that the sign of the other two will stay constant (and negative)


















We ¯rst notice that (11) does not depend on ±3. To evaluate sign(Á0(x0
3;±))we only
need to get estimates of ±1 and ±2, the linear coe±cients which measure the responsive-





~ x(¸;±) = 0 and solving for f±1;±2;x0
3g: There are two alternative set of
solutions, each of them corresponds to each of the restpoints. In particular:
· ±
0
1 = · ±
0
2 =
23 ¡ 49¯ ¡ 7
q




1 = ^ ±
0
2 =
23 ¡ 49¯ + 7
q
1 ¡ ¯(46 ¡ 49¯)
8





¡7 + 322¯ ¡ 343¯2 + (49¯ ¡ 23)
p





2863 ¡ 147476¯ + 882882¯2 ¡ 1546244¯3 + 823543¯4 + k
p
1 ¡ 46¯ + 49¯2
1000
(13)
with k = (3887 ¡ 60123¯+165669¯2 ¡ 117649¯3):
Both · Á0(¯) and ^ Á0(¯) are plotted in Figure 4. As the diagram shows, · Á0(¯) is always








; whereas ^ Á0(¯) is not. As a result of that, · x0 is
asymptotically stable whereas ^ x0 is not.
Figure 4
Asymptotic stability of the dynamic with drift
27We now move on to CASE 1. Here we have a unique rest point, which we call ^ x1 ´
(1;1; ^ x1









As in CASE 0, there are two (identical) negative eigenvalues (given that x3 >
1
2); and
the remaining eigenvalue equal to zero. By analogy with CASE 0, we now de¯ne ~ x(¸) ´
(1 ¡ ±1¸;1 ¡ ±2¸;x0




~ x(¸;±) = 0 to get estimates of ±:









2 ¡ 4¯3 +
p
9 ¡ 16¯ + 16¯2
´
2
The function corresponding to (12-13) takes now the following form:
^ Á
1(¯) =




with ® = 9 ¡ 16¯: The function ^ Á1(¯) is also plotted in Figure 4. As the diagram shows,
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Figure 4